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Abstract
The present paper examines an injurer causing a temporary black-
out to a firm as the primary victim but also affecting customers and
competitors of the firm. Reflecting existing legal practice, the paper
investigates efficiency properties of the negligence rule granting recov-
ery of private losses but to the primary victim only. The regime is
shown to provide efficient incentives for precaution provided that the
primary loss exceeds the social loss from accidents. The main contri-
bution of the paper consists of an explicit analysis of markets affected
by a temporary blackout of one firm. The analysis reveals that the
private loss exceeds the social loss indeed if the market is less than
fully competitive. Moreover, the net social loss remains positive, no
matter which market structure prevails.
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1 Introduction
Tort law holds the promise of internalizing negative external effects, which
otherwise would distort incentives for precaution. In fact, as I have shown
elsewhere,1 an extensive interpretation of the negligence rule would, in theory
at least, allow to handle even complicated situations involving several parties
and multilateral external effects. In practice, however, rather restrictive use
is made of the instrument. Bussani and Palmer (2003) summarize the argu-
ments in support of an exclusionary rule under the headline of ”floodgates”.
Permitting extensive recovery of losses would overwhelm the courts. Wide-
spread liability would place an excessive burden upon the defendant’s human
initiative and enterprise, enforcing a broad modern trend toward increasing
tort liability.
To keep floodgates closed, some legal systems including the German one
distinguish between damage to person or property from losses without an-
tecedent harm to plaintiff’s person or property. While such pure economic
losses, as they are referred to, cannot be recovered, damage to property,
including consequential loss, is granted recovery.
Bussani and Palmer present a bunch of case studies which aim at identify-
ing a common core of principles governing tortious liability for pure economic
loss in several European countries. Their cases cable I and cable II among
others are of particular interest for the economic analysis of the present pa-
per. Under cable II, the facts are constructed as follows. While operating his
mechanical excavator, injurer A cuts the cable belonging to the public util-
ity which delivers electricity to primary victim B. The unexpected blackout
caused the temporary loss of production. B is claiming compensation from
A for the damage caused by the loss of production. In the case of cable I, the
only difference is that, in addition to loss of production, the blackout also
caused damage to B’s machinery.
Bussani and Palmer summarize the legal practice as follows. In Belgium,
France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain, lost production or lost
profit will be compensated even in the absence of physical loss. These coun-
tries do not distinguish between damage to property and pure economic loss
per se. In Austria, Sweden and Finland, the primary victim could recover
1See Schweizer (2005b).
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damage to the machinery but would be denied recovery of lost production
or profit. In Germany and Portugal finally, the primary victim would be
granted recovery of both damage to the machinery and of lost production
or profit under cable I, whereas it would be denied recovery under cable II.
In other words, the rules governing such cases do not belong to the common
core of European tort law.
The above cable cases involve externalities beyond the injurer and the
primary victim. In fact, customers of B might also negatively be affected by
accidents as B’s shutdown or blackout may lead to temporary shortages on
the market it serves. Party B’s competitors, on the other side, may benefit
from such an accident as they may face increased demand. To focus on
the main issue at stake (and to keep floodgates closed), potential claims by
secondary victims are ruled out. Moreover, parties enjoying windfall gains
from accidents do not have to pay compensation for their benefits which is
true under most if not all legal systems. Therefore, quite likely, a discrepancy
between the private loss of the primary victim as compared to the social loss
from accidents does arise which has been examined in the economic literature
before.2
The main conclusions so far have been as follows. Under a regime of strict
liability, to induce efficient precaution, the injurer should face damages equal
to the social loss. Put differently, if just the primary victim can recover his
private loss that is different from social loss, incentives would be distorted.
More precisely, if private loss exceeds social loss there would be too much
whereas, otherwise, there would be too little precaution.
Bishop (1982) argues that, in a range of cases, private economic loss
caused by a tortious act is not a cost to society. His argument is widely
accepted and used to justify legal practice which denies recovery of pure
economic loss even to primary victims. Yet, as the present paper argues, that
range of cases may be narrower than thought. As it turns out, if the primary
victim operates in a fully competitive market then the social loss exceeds
the primary victim’s private loss such that granting recovery of private loss
only, let alone denying recovery would induce too little precaution. The same
holds obviously true if the primary victim serves its market as a monopolist.
2See, among others, Bishop (1982), Shavell (1987), Gilead (1997), Parisi (2003) and
Dari Mattiacci (2003) for an extensive discussion of private versus social loss.
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While the monopolist’s customers may suffer as secondary victims from the
temporary shutdown there is no party around who would benefit.
This leaves the more widespread case of imperfect competition in between.
Here, as it turns out, the primary victim’s private loss exceeds the social
loss such that granting full recovery of private loss would induce, under a
regime of strict liability, too much precaution indeed. Yet, as the social loss
remains positive quite generally, imperfect competition does neither support
Bishop’s case of no cost to society. Denying recovery would induce too little
precaution. Hence, under strict liability, there exist parameter constellations
where granting recovery of private loss but to the primary victim only would
outperform denying recovery and others where denying recovery would be
socially preferable.
Yet, many tort cases are governed, instead of strict liability, by negligence
rules. For becoming liable, the injurer must have violated a standard of con-
duct and his violation must have been the cause of the accident. Under such
a negligence rule, the potential injurer has no incentives for precaution be-
yond the negligence standard. Therefore, if this standard is equal to efficient
precaution the negligence rule provides incentives for efficient precaution pro-
vided that the injurer, if negligent, owes damages not below the social loss.
Notice the case of no loss to society (if it occurs at all) would also qualify for
efficient incentives under such a negligence rule.
The present paper identifies imperfect competition as the leading case
where the primary victim’s private loss exceeds the social loss. Since the
bulk of cases will concern markets governed by such imperfect competition,
on efficiency grounds, granting recovery of private loss but to the primary
victim only without requiring the primary victim’s competitors to compen-
sate for windfall gains seems justified. Under the circumstances of cable II,
this rule corresponds to legal practice in Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, the
Netherlands and Spain. Under cable I, such a rule would also capture legal
practice in Germany and Portugal. In any case, the rule is shown to provide
efficient incentives for precaution provided that the private loss exceeds the
social loss and that the negligence standard equals efficient precaution.3 As
a corollary, it follows that denying recovery of private loss to the primary
victim, even if the loss is of pure economic nature, cannot be justified on
3For a closely related result, see also Dari Mattiacci (2003).
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efficiency grounds, at least not if a blackout of a firm is at stake.
The main contribution of the present paper consists of pointing out that
the discrepancy between the primary victim’s private loss and the social loss
depends on the structure of the affected market. While the extreme cases
of monopoly and perfect competition are relatively easy to grasp, it is the
case of imperfect competition in between that proves most challenging for
intuition. Earlier findings on free entry under imperfect competition prove
helpful in understanding the result.
Recall, if competition is less than perfect, free entry would lead to the
range where social welfare is decreasing.4 Therefore, social welfare under a
blackout of the primary victim, net of the victim’s fixed costs, exceeds social
welfare without accident. Moreover, without the accident, the primary victim
would earn revenues covering both fixed and variable costs. As a consequence,
the primary victim’s private loss is then easily seen to exceed the social loss.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the general setting.
It examines the negligence rule with a standard of conduct where the injurer
owes damages if his violation of the standard has caused the accident. If
the standard equals efficient precaution and if damages are not lower than
the social loss keeping the standard is an optimal strategy of the injurer.
Moreover, if there are multiple optimal strategies all of them turn out to be
efficient. This robust efficiency result turns out to hold quite generally. More
restrictive assumptions are needed to show that other negligence rules, be it
that they are relying on inefficient standards or be it that the injurer owes
damages below the social loss, fail to provide efficient incentives.
Section 3 models the market affected by a blackout of the primary victim
explicitly. A first subsection deals with monopoly and perfect competition.
While the monopoly case is obvious, it is shown that, under perfect compe-
tition, the social loss exceeds the private loss of the primary victim provided
that marginal costs are strictly increasing. The case of constant marginal
costs is trivial as firms would earn zero profits and the accident would cause
neither a private nor a social loss. The second subsection deals with the linear
specification of the Cournot model. Unless the primary victim has marginal
4Weizsäcker (1980) has pointed out this result for the linear specification of Cournot
quantity competition. Mankiw and Whinston (1986) have extended it to more general
settings of imperfect competition.
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costs low enough relative to his competitors to approach the position of a
monopolist, his private loss is shown to exceed the social loss. Nevertheless,
the social loss remains positive in general such that Bishop’s range of cases
where private loss is not a cost to society does not cover the linear specifi-
cation of the Cournot model. The third subsection examines more general
market structures to confirm the findings of the previous subsection beyond
the linear specification of Cournot.
Section 4 takes up the view that entry choice may depend on the negli-
gence rule in place. It is shown that entry choice would be distorted down-
wards even if the market were governed by perfect competition and if the
negligence rule were perfect in the sense that it induces the injurer to take
socially optimal precaution.
Section 5 investigates capacity choice. While entry choice is modelled as a
binary decision, capacity choice faces a continuous range of alternatives. The
market, again, is assumed to be governed by perfect competition. Capacity
choice is shown to be distorted in the same direction as entry choice. However,
for continuous capacity choice, the distortion arises even in the complete
absence of accidents whereas for mere entry choice, distortions only arise if
accidents are expected to occur. These findings hint at the fact that the
blame for distortion of entry or capacity choice should not prematurely be
put on the negligence rule as such.
Rather, the obligations involved are of a multilateral nature and, to re-
store full efficiency, would have to be handled as such. In fact, an extensive
interpretation of the negligence rule which takes the multilateral nature into
account would provide efficient incentives both for precaution and capacity
choice. Section 6 concludes. Rigorous proofs of some of the propositions are
relegated to the appendix.
2 The general setting
The primary victim is assumed to be a firm supplying output to a given
market and possibly facing competing firms. On the other side of the market,
there are customers. In the absence of an accident, let W 0 denote social
welfare, i.e. the sum of customers’ and producers’ surplus andG0 the primary
victim’s profit. Moreover, let ∆S and ∆P denote the social loss and the
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primary victim’s private loss, respectively, from an accident.
The potential injurer decides on precaution r ∈ R = [0,∞). The proba-
bility of an accident depends on precaution and is denoted ε(r). Let
R∗ = argmax
r∈R
[1− ε(r)] ·W 0 + ε(r) ·
h
W 0 −∆S
i
− r
denote the set of efficient precautions. Equivalently, it holds that
R∗ = argmin
r∈R
r + ε(r) ·∆S.
Notice, without further restrictions, this set may contain more than one
element.
In the following, negligence rules with a standard of conduct rS are ex-
amined. Let d(r, rS) denote expected damages owed by the injurer. The
rational injurer takes precaution from the set
RI = argmin
r∈R
r + d(r, rS).
No damages are due if the injurer keeps the standard, i.e., d(rS, rS) = 0. To
ensure efficient incentives, it turns out to be sufficient if expected damages
d(r, rS) are never lower than the difference [ε(r)− ε(rS)] ·∆S of expected so-
cial losses under actual precaution and standard of conduct, no matter which
deviation r 6= rS from the standard has occurred. Under this assumption,
the following proposition establishes that, at an efficient standard, keeping
the standard is an optimal decision for the injurer and, if multiple decisions
exist that are optimal, they all must be efficient.
Proposition 1 If d(r, rS) ≥ [ε(r)− ε(rS)] ·∆S holds for any deviation r 6=
rS from the standard of conduct and if this standard is efficient, i.e. rS ∈ R∗
then rS ∈ RI ⊂ R∗.
Proof. Under the assumption of the proposition,
r + d(r, rS) ≥ r + [ε(r)− ε(rS)] ·∆S ≥ rS + d(rS, rS)
must hold for all r because rS minimizes total costs r+ ε(r) ·∆S and, hence,
rS also minimizes the injurer’s total costs r+d(r, rS) such that rS ∈ RI must
hold indeed. As a consequence, for any other decision r ∈ RI , it holds that
rS = r + d(r, rS) ≥ r + ε(r) ·∆S − ε(rS) ·∆S
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and, hence, that
rS + ε(rS) ·∆S ≥ r + ε(r) ·∆S
must also hold. Yet, since rS minimizes total costs, the above inequality
cannot be strict and, for that reason, r must be a cost minimizing decision
as well. It follows that RI ⊂ R∗ as was to be shown.
The proof can also be captured on more intuitive grounds. No matter,
which decision is taken by the injurer, the rest of society will be at least as
well of as if the injurer had kept the standard and since keeping the standard
minimizes total costs, it will also be in the injurer’s interest to meet the
standard.
The following two rules, among others, would meet the assumption of the
above proposition. First, suppose the injurer owes damages ∆H ≥ ∆S not
below the social loss if he spends less than the due standard rS on precaution.
Then the expected damages amount to dBr, rS) = λ
B(r, rs) ·∆H where
λB(r, rS) =



0 if r ≥ rS
1 if r < rS
defines liability, well in line with the traditional negligence rule as pioneered
by Brown (1973). Second, following Kahan (1989), suppose expected dam-
ages are equal to dK(r, rS) = λ
K(r, rs) ·∆H where
λK(r, rS) =



0 if r ≥ rS
ε(r)− ε(rS) if r < rS
and where, again, ∆H ≥ ∆S is assumed to hold. Both Brown’s and Kahan’s
versions of the negligence rule are easily seen to satisfy the assumption of
the above proposition and, hence, both rules provide efficient incentives for
precaution if the standard of conduct is equal to efficient precaution and
damages owed by the injurer if ruled liable are not lower than the social loss.
Kahan refers to the legal doctrine, according to which injurers are held
liable if they have acted negligently and their negligence has caused the
accident. Notice the injurer still owes full damages ∆H but only in those
states of nature where the accident has actually occurred but would have
been avoided if the injurer had kept the standard. Therefore, from the ex
ante perspective when the precaution decision must be taken, damages owed
by the injurer amount to [ε(r)− ε(rS)] ·∆H in expected terms.
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Kahan’s rule takes the above legal doctrine into account while the more
traditional rule does not. For that reason, the present paper rather sides
with Kahan’s rule. However, changes of results that would follow under the
more traditional negligence rule will also be hinted at.
For Proposition 1, which provides a sufficient condition on the negligence
rule for inducing efficient precaution, the exact specification of the negli-
gence rule does not matter. Characterizing necessary conditions, however,
turns out to be more subtle. To derive such conditions, for simplicity, the
probability of an accident ε(r) is assumed to be a differentiable, decreasing
and convex function of precaution, i.e. εr(r) < 0 and εrr(r) > 0. Notice,
none of these assumptions was needed to establish Proposition 1. Obviously,
it follows from these assumptions that efficient precaution r∗ and precautions
rB ∈ argmin r + dB(r, rS) and rK ∈ argmin r + dK(r, rS)
as induced by the above two damage rules are all unique. The following
proposition also refers to the precaution
rH = argmin
r
r + ε(r) ·∆H
that would result from strict liability, which is also unique under the assump-
tions made. The proposition establishes that the injurer chooses precaution
among the standard of conduct and the precaution that would result from
strict liability, whichever happens to be lower.
Proposition 2 Suppose the probability of an accident is a decreasing and
convex function of precaution. Then, under the damage rule as proposed by
Kahan, the injurer would choose precaution rK = min[rH , rS].
The proof of Proposition 2 is standard. Under strict liability, total costs of
the injurer amount to r+ε(r)·∆H which attain their minimum at precaution
rH . Under Kahan’s rule and in the range r ≤ rS, the injurer’s total costs
are equal to r + [ε(r)− ε(rS)] ·∆H which attain their minimum also at rH
provided rH is in this range. Otherwise, the injurer just keeps the standard
in order to minimize total costs as follows from the convex shape of total
costs.
Under Kahan’s rule, efficient incentives beyond the cases of Proposition 1
would only result if damages owed were equal to the social loss, i.e. ∆H = ∆S
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and the standard were excessive in the sense of rS > r∗. In all other cases,
incentives of the injurer are distorted. In particular, if damages owed were
lower than social loss, i.e. ∆H < ∆S then rH < r∗ and, hence, insufficient
incentives result from Kahan’s rule as follows directly from Proposition 2.
Under the more traditional negligence rule proposed by Brown, the injurer
would decide as follows:
rB =



rS if rS ≤ rH
∈ {rH , rS} if rH < rS
.
In fact, under Brown’s rule and in the open range r < rS, total costs of the
injurer amount to r+ε(r)·∆H. If rS ≤ rH , then these costs are decreasing in
the open range such that the infimum is not attained in this range. Rather,
the injurer meets the standard to escape liability. However, if rH < rS, then
the injurer’s total costs attain a minimum in the open range at rH which
must then be compared with precaution costs rS where the injurer’s total
costs attain their minimum in the closed range rS ≤ r. Under Brown’s rule,
the injurer chooses among the minima from the two ranges. Such ambiguity
arises from the discontinuous jump of the expected damages at the standard
of conduct. As a consequence, even if damages owed are lower than the
social loss, i.e. ∆H < ∆S, efficient incentives may still result from Brown’s
version of the negligence rule provided that the standard is equal to efficient
precaution.
To sum up, if damages owed by the injurer are not lower than the social
loss and if the standard of conduct is equal to efficient precaution then the
injurer has efficient incentives for precaution quite generally. If damages
owed by the injurer are lower than the social loss then the injurer will have
insufficient incentives for precaution under Kahan’s version of the negligence
rule whereas, under Brown’s version of the negligence rule, efficient incentives
may still prevail though not necessarily so.
3 The affected market
In this section, the market affected by a tortious act is modelled explicitly.
The primary victim is assumed to be a firm supplying output to a given
market. Firm i ∈M = {1, ...,m} has cost functionKi(xi) = ki(xi)+φi where
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φi denotes fixed costs of firm i. Marginal costs are positive and increasing
(dki(xi)/dxi > 0 and d2ki(xi)/dx2i > 0). On the other side of the market,
there are customers. The inverse demand function of the customers is denoted
by f(X) and is equal to the price at which demand would clear market
supply X. The law of demand is assumed to hold, i.e. the inverse demand
function is downwards sloping (df(X)/dX < 0). No matter whether markets
are perfectly or imperfectly competitive, let x0i and X
0 =
P
i∈M x
0
i denote
output of firm i and aggregate output, respectively, if there is no accident.
Then the profit of firm i amounts to
G0i = g
0
i − φi = f(X0) · x0i −Ki(x0i )
and customers’ surplus amounts to
c0 =
Z X0
0
f(X)dX − f(X0) ·X0
whereas social welfare amounts to
W 0 = w0 −
X
i∈M
φi = c
0 +
X
i∈M
g0i −
X
i∈M
φi =
Z X(m)
0
f(X)dX −
X
i∈M
Ki(x
0
i ).
If there is an accident, the blackout causes a temporary loss of produc-
tion to the primary victim v ∈ M . The victim must bear the fixed costs
with and without accident and, for that reason, fixed costs do not affect the
victim’s private loss arising from the accident. Rather, the victim’s private
loss amounts to revenues minus variable costs, i.e.
∆P = g0v = f(X
0) · x0v − kv(x0v).
Depending on the shape of marginal costs, the other firms may be able to
offset, in part at least, the victim’s lost production. After the accident, the
output of firm i 6= v is x−vi and total output is X−v =
P
i6=v x
−v
i . The profit of
firm i 6= v amounts to g−vi = f(X−v) ·x−vi −ki(x−vi ) and customers’ surplus to
c−v =
RX−v
0 f(X)dX − f(X−v) ·X−v. The social welfare during the blackout
of the primary victim net of fixed costs amounts to w−v = c−v +
P
i6=v g
−v
i .
The social loss from an accident amounts to ∆S = w0 − w−v such that the
discrepancy between private and social loss is
∆P −∆S = g0v + w−v − w0. (1)
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Recall, it is the sign of (1) which matters if the efficiency of the negligence
rule granting recovery of private losses but to the primary victim only is at
stake. This sign turns out to depend on the market structure as I now want
to show.
3.1 Monopoly and perfect competition
The simplest case is that of a primary victim serving the market as a mo-
nopolist. Since, by definition of a monopoly, there are no competitors that
could benefit from the primary victim’s blackout and since the customers
loose their surplus, the social loss, not only, must be positive but must even
exceed the private loss of the primary victim. In fact, the monopolist’s loss
is less than social loss by the amount of customers’ surplus.
A similar result holds true if the primary victim serves a market governed
by perfect (short-run) competition where firms do not perceive any market
power. Due to competitive pressure, prices equal marginal costs (but may
still be higher than average costs):
dki(x
0
i )
dxi
= f(X0) and
dki(x
−v
i )
dxi
= f(X−v)
In this case, too, it can be shown that ∆S > ∆P must hold.
In case of an accident, the other firms will make up for part of the reduc-
tion in supply but the price will raise. Figure 1 provides a standard demand
and supply diagram from which the result can easily be visualized. Notice,
that
−kv(x0v) =
X
i6=v
ki(x
0
i )−
X
i∈M
ki(x
0
i )
must hold and recall that total costs net of fixed costs are equal to the area
under the appropriate supply curve. Since social surplus is equal to the area
between demand and supply curves, the discrepancy∆S−∆P must be equal
to the area 123 in figure 1 and, hence, must be positive as claimed.
[Figure 1 here approximately]
Surprisingly enough, monopoly and perfect competition both lead to a
situation where the social loss, not only, remains positive but even exceeds
the private loss of the primary victim. Therefore, if the primary victim
serves his market as a monopolist the negligence rule granting recovery but
to the primary victim only induces too little precaution. Yet the rule still
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outperforms the rule that denies recovery. Moreover, neither monopoly nor
perfect competition at increasing marginal costs support Bishop’s range of
cases involving no loss to society.
3.2 Linear specification of the Cournot model
Under the Cournot model, accidents will cause positive social losses even if
marginal costs are constant. In fact, though lost output may be provided by
others at the same costs, due to lessened competition, prices will raise if one
of the suppliers suffers from a temporary blackout. Since there are counter-
vailing forces at work, the overall effect remains difficult to grasp. To obtain
first insights, the linear specification of the Cournot model is investigated,
which allows to calculate private and social losses explicitly. Later, more
general market structures are examined and some intuition will be provided.
Let us assume that marginal costs ci of firm i are constant such that
total costs at output xi amount to Ki(xi) = cixi + φi. Inverse demand of
customers is assumed linear f(X) = A − X. In the following, the findings
of some tedious but straightforward calculations are listed. Under quantity
competition in the sense of Cournot, firm i maximizes profit
x0i ∈ argmaxxi (A− ci − xi −
X
j 6=i
x0j) · xi.
It follows from first order conditions that total supply and supply of firm i
amount to
X0 =
m
m− 1 · (A− c
a) and x0i =
A− ca + (m+ 1) · (ca − ci)
m+ 1
,
respectively, where ca =
P
i∈M ci/m denotes average marginal costs. The
solution is tacitly assumed to be interior such that all firms supply some
positive quantity.
In the absence of an accident, the profit of firm i net of fixed costs amounts
to
g0i = (x
0
i )
2 =
(A− ca)2
(m+ 1)2
+
2(A− ca) · (ca − ci)
m+ 1
+ (ca − ci)2
and the customers’ surplus to
c0 =
1
2
· (X0)2 = m
2(A− ca)2
2(m+ 1)2
.
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Hence, social welfare net of fixed costs amounts to
w0 = c0 +
X
i∈M
g0i =
(m2 + 2m) · (A− ca)2
2(m+ 1)2
+
X
i∈M
(ca − ci)2.
If there is an accident leading to a blackout of the primary victim v ∈ M ,
social welfare net of fixed costs amounts to
w−v = c−v +
X
i6=v
g−vi =
(m2 − 1) · (A− c−v)2
2m2
+
X
i6=v
(c−v − ci)2
where c−v =
P
i6=v ci/(m − 1) denotes average marginal costs after the acci-
dent. The discrepancy between private and social loss amounts to
∆P −∆S (2)
= w−v + g0v − w0 =
=
2m2 − 2m− 1
2m2(m+ 1)2
· (A− ca)2 +
+
m2 − 2m− 1
m2(m+ 1)
· (A− ca) · (ca − cv)− 2m+ 1
2m2
· (ca − cv)2
and the social loss to
∆S =
2m+ 1
2m2(m+ 1)2
· (A− ca)2 +
+
m2 + 2m+ 1
m2(m+ 1)
· (A− ca) · (ca − cv) + 2m
2 + 2m+ 1
2m2
· (ca − cv)2.
While it seems difficult to provide general intuition for the above terms,
several limiting cases are more easy to grasp.
First, obviously it must hold that
lim
m→∞
∆P −∆S = 0.
In fact, for m → ∞, Cournot competition under the linear specification is
approaching the case of perfect competition. Under perfect competition and
at constant marginal costs, firms would earn zero profit and a blackout would
cause neither a private nor a social loss. Therefore, the discrepancy would
vanish, well in line with the above limiting case under Cournot competition.
Second, suppose the primary victim produces very little even in the ab-
sence of a blackout (x0v ≈ 0). Then, the private as well as the social loss from
a blackout would be negligible (∆P ≈ ∆S ≈ 0, hence ∆P −∆S ≈ 0), in line
with (2).
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Third, suppose all competitors of the primary victim produce negligible
quantities (x0i ≈ 0 for i 6= v) then the case is approaching that of a monopolist
suffering from the blackout. For this case, the discrepancy has been shown, in
the previous subsection, to be negative, again in line with the corresponding
property as derived from (2).
Fourth, if the primary victim has average marginal costs (cv = ca) and
if there exists at least one competitor (m ≥ 2) then the discrepancy must
be positive (∆P − ∆S > 0) as follows from (2). In this case, the formula
coincides with the one where all firms have equal marginal costs and which
is less messy to calculate.
Fifth, ceteris paribus, the discrepancy is a concave, the social loss a convex
function of cv. Therefore, a cutoff value c# < ca must exist such that the
discrepancy ∆P −∆S > 0 remains positive if and only if the marginal costs
of the primary victim exceed this cutoff. In other words, unless the primary
victim has relatively low marginal costs as compared to its competitors the
private loss of the victim exceeds the social loss. The social loss is positive if
the victim has average marginal costs. The social loss vanishes if the marginal
costs of the victim are so high that his output becomes negligible. It then
follows from convexity that the social loss is positive as long as the primary
victim would remain active in the absence of an accident. In other words, the
linear specification of Cournot does not confirm Bishop’s case of zero social
loss. However, it supports the use of the negligence rule granting recovery
but to the primary victim only. The following proposition summarizes these
findings.
Proposition 3 Under the linear specification of the Cournot model, the pri-
mary victim’s private loss exceeds the social loss if and only if the primary
victim’s marginal costs are not too small relative to the rivals’ marginal costs.
In particular, this condition would be met if all firms had the same marginal
costs. Moreover, the social loss always remains positive.
So far, these claims have been established for the linear specification of
Cournot. They hold far beyond as I now want to show.
15
3.3 More general market structures
In this section, more general market structures are examined. Yet, for sim-
plicity, firms are assumed to be symmetric. Inverse demand is assumed to
obey the law of demand but need not be restrained otherwise. The cost
function of each firm is K(x) = k(x) + φ where φ denotes fixed costs.
Marginal costs are assumed to be positive and to be strictly increasing, i.e.
dk(x)/dx > 0 and d2k(x)/dx2 > 0. For a given market structure, let x(m)
and X(m) = m · x(m) denote output per firm and market supply, respec-
tively, if m firms are active. It is assumed that output per firm decreases
whereas market supply increases as more firms are brought in, i.e.
dx(m)
dm
< 0 and
dX(m)
dm
> 0. (3)
Finally, since the case of (short-run) perfect competition has already been
dealt with, prices are assumed to exceed marginal costs, i.e.
f(X(m))− dk(x(m))
dx
> 0
holds for all m. For such a setting, the following proposition can be estab-
lished.
Proposition 4 Under imperfect competition, the social loss from an acci-
dent remains positive. Moreover, under free entry at least, the primary vic-
tim’s private loss exceeds the social loss.
Therefore, under the assumptions of this proposition, the negligence rule
granting recovery of private losses but to primary victims only provides effi-
cient incentives for precaution. Denying recovery even to the primary victim,
however, would typically provide insufficient incentives for precaution.
A rigorous proof of this proposition can be found in the appendix. The
following intuition may be of help in grasping the claim. Since fixed costs
arise with and without accident, the social loss does not depend on the level
of fixed costs. Moreover, while fixed costs may affect the entry decision of
firms, they are not relevant for quantity choice. Therefore, the social loss
from a blackout of one of the suppliers in a setting with fixed costs would be
the same as in the absence of fixed costs. Yet, in the absence of fixed costs,
the blackout will lead to higher prices as competition is lessened. Since higher
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prices mean a lower sum of producers’ and customers’ surplus, the social loss
will be positive indeed.
To understand the second claim of the proposition, a little algebra may
be of help. Let W (m) denote the sum of customers’ and producers’ surplus
net of fixed costs and G(m) the profit per firm also net of fixed costs if m
firms are present. Suppose m0 firms are present before the accident. Due to
an accident, one of the firms suffers from a temporary blackout. Since the
victim must bear its fixed costs with and without the accident, its private
loss amounts to ∆P = G(m0)+φ. The social loss from the accident amounts
to ∆S =W (m0)−W (m0 − 1) + φ. Indeed, since the first term contains the
fixed costs of m0 firms, the second term of m0 − 1 firms and since the social
loss does neither depend on fixed costs, fixed costs must be added once to
arrive at the social loss from the accident. The discrepancy between private
and social losses then amounts to ∆P −∆S = G(m0)+W (m0−1)−W (m0).
Under the linear specification of the Cournot model, this discrepancy
turned out to be positive for any number of firms. For the above proposition,
the number m0 is assumed to result from free entry. At free entry, profits net
of fixed cost will be zero and, hence, the discrepancy is equal to ∆P −∆S =
W (m0 − 1) −W (m0) which is positive for the following reason. Under less
than perfect competition, firms may survive even if they have higher costs
than some of their competitors. For similar reasons, under less than perfect
competition, more firms can survive with non-negative profits than what
would be optimal (second best given the price distortion). In other words,
the sum of customers’ and producers’ surplus net of fixed costs with m0 − 1
firms would be higher than with m0 firms and, hence, private loss ∆P would
exceed social loss ∆S as was to be shown.
Notice the second claim of the proposition is derived under the implicit
assumption that firms when deciding about entry do not anticipate that they
may possibly be affected by a blackout caused by a tortious act. If they would
anticipate such accidents the negligence rule in place may influence the entry
decision as will be investigated in the next section.
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4 Anticipating accidents under perfect negli-
gence rules
So far, firms took the entry decision without anticipating that they might
possibly be disrupted from power supply by a cable accident. In the present
section, the strategic interaction between the entry decision and the negli-
gence rule in place is explored. It will turn out that the entry decision may
well be distorted. But the main message will be that the blame for such
distortions should not be put on the negligence rule a such.
To arrive at such conclusion, imagine the following timing of events. After
firms have decided to enter the market, with some probability, the injurer
starts operating in the neighborhood of one of the competing firms. The
socially optimal level of precaution by the injurer depends on the number of
firms that are potentially affected by a temporary blackout. If the negligence
rule in place provides incentives for socially optimal precaution and if the
injurer escapes liability by choosing efficient precaution, for obvious reasons,
the negligence rule may justly be called perfect.
To focus on potential distortions at the entry stage, let us assume that the
negligence rule is perfect and that the market supplied by the firms operates
under perfect competition as well. Still, too few firms will enter for the
following reason.
Since the injurer will meet the standard of conduct, the firm suffering from
a blackout cannot recover its private loss. Its competitors will enjoy a windfall
gain due to the blackout for which they must not pay any compensation. In
this way, a firm’s entry decision may give rise to a positive externality for
the benefit of its competitors. It is this positive externality, which stops
entry before the optimal number of firms is reached in spite of the fact that
the negligence rule is assumed to provide perfectly efficient incentives for
precaution. The following proposition, whose rigorous proof can be fund in
the appendix, summarizes these findings.
Proposition 5 Suppose the market is governed by perfect competition and
liability is governed by a perfect negligence rule. Then entry choice would be
distorted downwards.
While the present section looks at distortions of the mere entry decision,
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the next section explores potential distortions of capacity choice of a more
general type. Capacity choice affects the cost structure of a firm. Extra
capacity may also be held as a backup against blackouts. Both aspects of
capacity choice will be investigated.
5 Capacity choice
To begin with, the situation is explored where capacity choice only concerns
the cost structure of firms. At high capacity, fixed costs are high but marginal
costs are low and, vice versa, at low capacity. The next proposition shows
that even if the output market is governed by perfect competition and in the
complete absence of any accidents leading to blackouts, capacity choice will
be distorted. Therefore, if such accidents are anticipated possibly to occur
then, no matter how perfect the negligence rule will be, it should not be
expected to cure the fundamental distortion underlying capacity choice.
Proposition 6 Even if output markets were governed by perfect competi-
tion and in the absence of any accidents, capacity choice would be distorted
downwards.
A rigorous proof of this proposition is given in the appendix. The follow-
ing intuition captures the essence of the arguments. Imagine that firm i is ex-
tending its capacity. As a consequence, firm i will enjoy lower marginal costs
and, hence, will increase its supply to the market while its competitors will
decrease their supply as their relative cost situation has worsened. Nonethe-
less, total output will be higher if one of the firms increases its capacity and,
hence, prices will be lower. Customers are benefitting while competitors are
suffering from an increase in firm i’s capacity. Overall, as it turns out, the
discrepancy between social and private benefits from increasing the capacity
remains positive. Due to this positive external effect, capacity choice will be
distorted downwards as claimed by the above proposition.
The remaining part of this section is devoted to extra capacity, which is
held, not to reduce marginal costs, but rather as a backup against black-
outs caused by accidents. I shall argue that this gives rise to a setting of
multilateral obligations. In fact, by holding extra capacity at an excessive
level, the competitors are deprived of potential windfall gains arising with
19
a temporary blackout of the firm holding such capacity. It is shown that if
the competitors could recover losses from excessive extra capacities, efficient
incentives for capacity choice of the firm would be restored.
The simplest setting illustrating this claim is as follows. The injurer
decides on precaution r ∈ R = [0,∞). There are just two firms, the po-
tential victim v and its only competitor c. If an accident occurs the victim
suffers from a private loss ∆P > 0 whereas its competitor enjoys a wind-
fall gain ∆Q > 0. Following some of the earlier literature, for simplicity,
the customers’ loss is neglected such that the net social loss amounts to
∆S = ∆P −∆Q and exceeds the victim’s private loss by the windfall gain
of its competitor.
If capacities are hold as a backup against accidents capacity choice affects
the probability of a private loss arising from an accident. Let κ ∈ [0,∞)
denote the victim’s capacity choice. Then the victim’s private loss ∆P and
his competitor’s windfall gain∆Q arises with probability ε(r,κ). The efficient
precaution and capacity (first best) solves
(r∗,κ∗) ∈ argmin r + κ+ ε(r,κ) ·∆S. (4)
The following analysis concentrates on Kahan’s version of the negligence
rule. Under a unilateral rule with efficient standard of conduct and granting
recovery of private losses to the victim, the injurer owes damages to the
victim amounting to
di(r,κ) = max [ε(r,κ)− ε(r∗,κ), 0] ·∆P
in expected terms. It follows from the proof of the next proposition that,
under such a unilateral negligence rule, the best response of the injurer to the
efficient capacity choice would be efficient precaution, well in line with the
findings of section 3. Yet, the victim’s best response to efficient precaution
would consist of excessive capacity. Nonetheless, the blame for distorted
capacity choice should not be put on the negligence rule as such but rather
on its unilateral nature.
Strictly speaking, by holding excessive capacity, the victim inflicts harm
on his competitor. To reflect this fact, suppose the victim would owe damages
amounting to
dv(r,κ) = max [ε(r,κ
∗)− ε(r,κ), 0] ·∆Q
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in expected terms to his competitor accordingly. This rule takes into account
that excessive capacities impose a negative externality on the competitor as
the probability of his enjoying a windfall gain would be diminished. In any
case, the above multilateral negligence scheme where injurer and primary
victim both owe damages would restore full efficiency as the following propo-
sition establishes.
Proposition 7 Efficient precaution and efficient capacities are a Nash equi-
librium under the above multilateral negligence scheme.
Proof. Suppose, first, that the victim has chosen efficient capacity κ = κ∗.
Then the injurer bears total expected costs
r + di(r,κ
∗) ≥ r + [ε(r,κ∗)− ε(r∗,κ∗), 0] ·∆S ≥ r∗ = r∗ + di(r∗,κ∗)
that attain their minimum at efficient precaution. Hence, efficient precaution
r∗ is the injurer’s best response to efficient capacity κ∗ of the victim.
Suppose, second, that the injurer has chosen efficient precaution r∗ and,
hence, escapes liability. Then the victim bears total expected costs
κ+ ε(r∗,κ) ·∆P + dv(r∗,κ)
≥ κ+ ε(r∗,κ) · (∆P −∆Q) + ε(r∗,κ∗) ·∆Q ≥
≥ κ∗ + ε(r∗,κ∗) ·∆P = κ∗ + ε(r∗,κ∗) ·∆P + dv(r∗,κ∗)
that attain their minimum at efficient capacity. Hence, efficient capacity κ∗ is
the victim’s best response to efficient precaution r∗ as well. This establishes
the proposition.
The intuition behind the above proof is exactly the same as for Proposi-
tion 1. The present proposition shows that an extensive interpretation of the
negligence rule would restore full efficiency with respect to both precaution
and capacity choice.5 However, to keep the floodgates closed, existing legal
systems would probably hesitate to rely on such an extensive interpretation
of the negligence rule.
5See Schweizer (2005c) for another setting where a multilateral version of the negligence
rule restores full efficiency.
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6 Concluding remarks
The present paper examines an injurer who directly affects a primary victim
but also indirectly affects the victim’s customers and competitors. In fear
of floodgates, existing legal systems are reluctant to grant recovery of losses
to secondary victims. Arguments in favor of such exclusionary practice hint
at the other fact that beneficiaries enjoying windfall gains from accidents
do neither have to pay compensation. While it is not explicitly claimed
that benefits and losses balance exactly, the arguments implicitly allude to
a discrepancy between the private loss to the primary victim and the social
loss from accidents. The argument is used to justify the restrictive use of
granting recovery to indirectly affected parties and, at times, even to the
primary victim.
While a discrepancy between private and social loss distorts incentives for
precaution under a regime of strict liability, this need not be the case under
a negligence rule. In fact, if precaution generates a negative externality to
third parties then granting recovery of private losses to primary victims in
excess of social losses does not provide excessive incentives as liability would
be waved at and beyond efficient precaution.
The present paper explicitly examines the market which may be affected
by the tortious act of the injurer. While under both monopoly and perfect
competition, the social loss exceeds the primary victim’s private loss, the
more likely case of imperfect competition in between turns out to enhance
the performance of the above negligence rule.
The dividing line under actual legal systems such as the German one is
the nature of loss. While damage to person or property can be recovered,
pure economic losses cannot. In cases such as cable I and II, this practice is
likely to deny recovery of losses to parties that are only indirectly affected
by accidents. The analysis of this paper justifies such an exclusionary rule
on economic grounds. Yet it fails to justify that even the primary victim
may be denied recovery if the harm suffered from an accident classifies as
pure economic loss. In fact, since cases such a cable I and II seem to be
isomorphic from the economic perspective, an exclusionary rule with respect
to the primary victim remains difficult to explain.
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8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4:
The profit per firm amounts to
G(m) = g(m)− φ = f(X(m)) · x(m)− k(x(m))− φ.
Social welfare amounts to
W (m) = w(m)−m · φ =
Z X(m)
0
f(X)dX −m · k(x(m))−m · φ
and marginal welfare from adding a marginal firm amounts to
dW (m)
dm
= G(m) +m ·
"
f(X(m))− dk(x(m))
dx
#
· dx(m)
dm
< G(m)
and is strictly less than the profit per firm. Without entry barriers, firms
enter until economic profits vanish, i.e. G(m0) = 0. Therefore, at free entry,
marginal social welfare dW (m0)/dm < G(m0) = 0 is negative. Due to im-
perfect competition, the market would sustain more firms than what would
be second best.6 Hence, under imperfect competition and free entry, social
welfare with a blackout but net of the victim’s fixed costs W (m0 − 1) ex-
ceeds social welfare W (m0) without accident. It follows that he discrepancy
between private and social loss from the accident
∆P −∆S =W (m0 − 1)−W (m0) +G(m0) =W (m0 − 1)−W (m0) > 0
would be positive indeed.
Since fixed costs must be borne, with and without accident, the social
loss amounts to
∆S = w(m)− w(m− 1).
In the absence of fixed costs, any plausible market theory predicts that a
higher number of firms would increase both competition and social welfare
such that the social loss ∆S would remain positive quite generally. As a
6This result is due to Mankiw and Whinston (1986).
24
consequence, the case of imperfect competition does neither support Bishop’s
case of zero social loss.
Proof of Proposition 5:
Suppose, at the first stage, m firms have decided to enter the market.
At the second stage, with probability α, the injurer starts operating in the
neighborhood of one of the competing firms. For simplicity, a symmetric
setting is imposed such that, from the ex ante view, each firm expects the
injurer starting its operation next to its own site with probability α/m. At
the third stage, the injurer, after having started his activity in the neighbor-
hood of one of the competing firms, chooses precaution r ∈ R = [0,∞). The
expected social welfare amounts to
Y (m, r) = w(m)−m · φ− α · [r + ε(r) · (w(m)− w(m− 1))]
where w(m) denotes the sum of customers’ and producers’ surplus net of
fixed costs as a function of the number m of active firms.
Under a perfect negligence rule, the injurer is given incentives to choose
socially optimal precaution
r∗ = r∗(m) ∈ argmin
r∈R
r + ε(r) · [w(m)− w(m− 1)]
and, by doing so, he avoids liability for accidents. Socially optimal precaution
depends on the number of active firms.
Anticipating such behavior, a firm’s expected profit from the perspective
of the first stage amounts to
Γ(m, r) = g(m)− φ+ α · m− 1
m
· ε(r) · [g(m− 1)− g(m)]− α
m
· ε(r) · g(m)
where g(m) denotes the profit per firm net of fixed costs and in the absence
of an accident. Notice, from the first stage’s view, a firm does not know, if
at all, whether it will benefit from a competitor being hit by an accident or
whether it will end up as the primary victim itself.
Since the injurer is expected, by choosing socially efficient precaution, to
escape liability, the number of firms m0 entering under the present setting
follows from Γ(m0, r∗(m0)) = 0. Even if the market is governed by perfect
competition, the level of entry turns out to be insufficient as I now want to
show.
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Under (short-run) perfect competition, the marginal surplus from adding
a marginal firm is equal to the profit per firm, i.e. dw(m)/dm = g(m). It
follows that
∂Y (m, r)
∂m
= g(m)− φ− α · ε(r) · [g(m)− g(m− 1)]
must hold. Furthermore, under socially optimal precaution,
dY (m, r∗(m))
dm
=
∂Y (m, r∗(m))
∂m
must also hold. Since, finally,
∂Y (m, r)
∂m
− Γ(m, r) = α
m
· ε(r) · g(m− 1) > 0
it follows that, at free entry while anticipating accidents,
dY (m0, r∗(m0))
dm
> 0
must hold such that entry would stop in the range indeed where social surplus
is still increasing. Therefore, free entry while anticipating accidents would
remain insufficient as was to be shown.
Proof of Proposition 6:
Capacity choice is modelled as a game in extensive form. At he first stage,
m firms decide about their capacities. At the second stage, the market is
governed by perfect competition such that prices equal marginal costs. Even
if accidents can be ruled out entirely, capacity choice suffers from distortion
as I now want to show.
Capacity affects the cost structure of firms. At high capacity, fixed costs
are high but marginal costs are low. Formally, if firm j operates at capacity
κj and produces x units of output, its costs amount to K(x,κj) = k(x,κj)+
φ(κj). The cost function is assumed to exhibit the following properties:
∂k(x,κj)
∂x
> 0,
∂2k(x,κj)
∂x2
> 0,
∂2k(x,κj)
∂x∂κj
< 0 and
dφ(κj)
dκj
> 0.
Moreover, let κ = (κ1, ...,κm) denote the capacity profile chosen at the first
stage.
Let xj = xj(κ) and X = X(κ) =
P
j xj(κ) denote output of firm j and
total output, respectively, as functions of the capacity profile. Due to perfect
competition, prices are equal to marginal costs, i.e.
f(X) =
∂k(xj,κj)
∂xj
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must hold for j = 1, ...,m. Differentiating these equations with respect to
firm i’s capacity leads to
df(X)
dX
· ∂X
∂κi
=
∂2k(xj,κj)
∂x2j
· ∂xj
∂κi
+ δij · ∂
2k(xj,κj)
∂xj∂κi
where δij denotes Kronecker’s symbol (δii = 1 and δij = 0 for i 6= j). It
follows that positive values µ > 0 and µj > 0 exist such that
∂xj
∂κi
= −µj ·
∂X
∂κi
+ δij · µ
and, hence, 
1 +
mX
j=1
µj

 · ∂X
∂κi
= µ > 0
must hold. As a consequence, total output increases, i.e. ∂X/∂κi > 0, the
output of all competitors decreases, i.e. ∂xj/∂κi < 0 for j 6= i, whereas the
output of firm i increases, i.e. ∂xi/∂κi > 0 if firm i has increased its capacity.
The profit of firm j amounts to
Gj = Gj(κ) = gj − φ(κj) = gj(κ)− φ(κj) = f(X) · xj −K(xj,κj)
whereas social welfare net of fixed costs amounts to
w = w(κ) =
Z X(κ)
0
f(X)dX −
X
j
k(xj,κj).
Therefore, the marginal increase of social welfare from increasing the capacity
of firm i amounts to
∂w
∂κi
= f(X(κ)) · ∂X
∂κi
−
X
j
∂k(xj,κj)
∂xj
· ∂xj
∂κi
− ∂k(xi,κi)
∂κi
=
X
j
"
f(X(κ))− ∂k(xj,κj)
∂xj
#
· ∂xj
∂κi
− ∂k(xi,κi)
∂κi
.
Similarly, the marginal increase of firm i’s profit from increasing its capacity
amounts to
∂gi
∂κi
= f(X(κ)) · ∂xi
∂κi
− ∂k(xi,κi)
∂xi
· ∂xi
∂κi
+
df(X(κ))
dX
· ∂X
∂κi
− ∂k(xi,κi)
∂κi
and, hence, the discrepancy between social and private benefit from increas-
ing firm i’s capacity remains positive, more precisely
∂w
∂κi
− ∂gi
∂κi
= −df(X(κ))
dX
· ∂X
∂κi
> 0.
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In other words, expanding capacity under fully competitive pressure gives
rise to a positive externality such that non-cooperative behavior will lead
to capacities that are distorted downwards even in the complete absence of
accidents.
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Figure 1: discrepancy between private and social loss
